MCP tools

Keep a verifiable record of important MCP tool calls.

When a tool changes data, sends something, spends money or triggers another system, create a signed record of the call and reported result that can be checked later.

"_meta": {
  "org.peacprotocol/receipt_ref": "sha256:f04d11...",
  "org.peacprotocol/receipt_jws": "eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIs..."
}

The record rides the tool result's _meta. Hosts that do not know PEAC ignore it; the tool's own result is untouched.

The problem

An MCP transcript is hard to hand to a customer.

A transcript lives in the operator's system, where a customer or partner cannot check it. A signed record answers the questions they will ask:

  • Which tool was called, with which parameter digest?
  • Which policy or tool definition applied at that moment?
  • Was the call allowed, denied, or modified?
  • What result digest came back?
  • Who issued the record, and can it be verified without the server?
The specimen

What the record of one tool call contains.

mcp-tool-runverified offline
Issuer
https://mcp.vendor.example
Tool
tools.call search_docs
Params
sha256:c41b09...
Policy
tool-policy:v2 sha256:4e21b8...
Result
ok sha256:9a3c1d...
Time
2026-06-12T14:08:11Z
Signature
Ed25519 7d40e2c9... kid 2026-06-key1
sample record - demo signature

Paid MCP tool records compose the same way: the record binds the tool name, an args digest, and the observed payment receipt digest, and is carried in the tool result metadata.

Verify on any machine, later
$ npx -y @peac/cli@0.16.4 verify ./mcp-tool-run.jws --public-key ./jwks.json
Signature valid (offline).
$ # now edit one byte of the record and retry
$ npx -y @peac/cli@0.16.4 verify ./mcp-tool-run.tampered.jws --public-key ./jwks.json
Verification failed: Ed25519 signature verification failed
Code: E_INVALID_SIGNATURE
Two ways tampering shows up
  • Edited record: any change after signing breaks the Ed25519 signature, so verification fails.
  • Swapped content: the record binds a content digest. If the content you were handed does not hash to the digest in a validly signed record, the mismatch is caught at extraction.
Several sources, one case
Tool definition, approval, gateway decision, invocation and result can be bundled for a reviewer. See an evidence case.
Refusals are records too
A denied tool call can be signed: the tool, the policy, the reason and the time. See a gateway decision.
Boundaries

What Originary does not do here.

  • It does not run your MCP server.
  • It does not choose which tools are safe.
  • It does not replace MCP auth.
  • It does not require your users to have an Originary account.
  • It does not need your raw logs.

It adds signed records to the tool calls you choose.

Start with one MCP tool.

Pick the tool a customer or partner already asks about, and we will work out its record with you.